



**ENHANCED LIVELIHOODS IN THE MANDERA TRIANGLE
PROGRAM (ELMT)**

Workshop Report on

**Cross-border Contingency Planning for Possible El Niño Flooding
Garissa-Lower Juba**

Held from - 15th -17th September2009 in Almond Hotel Garissa

By Simon Levin

September2009



Introduction

Predictions for the Oct-Nov rainy season in the Horn of Africa are that there is a possibility of El Niño phenomena, including an extended rainy season and more than usually heavy rains. Given the destruction caused by El Niño in 1999, it is important to have plans in place for any emergency responses that may be needed in order for assistance to be able to be provided on time.

CARE-Somalia programme together with CARE-Kenya and the DMO of Garissa District organised a workshop on 15th- 17th September in Garissa with two objectives:

- to analyse possible flood scenarios and develop a broad response and preparedness strategy that would include coordination with actors in Kenya and Somalia
- to test a new methodology for contingency planning and developing preparedness plans, for possible use in improving drought and other contingency plans in the future.

The methodology for contingency and preparedness planning had been developed by PACAPS and previously piloted with Wajir East DSG in May 09 for drought response.

This workshop was attended by District officials from the three Districts of Garissa, Fafi and Lagdera, CARE-Kenya (Garissa and Mandera) and by NGOs working in Somalia and on cross-border issues. This report is a summary of the proceedings of the workshop. (Note: a full list of participants and the workshop timetable is included in annexes 1 and 2)

Part 1 Analysing the performance and usefulness of previous contingency planning

Eastern Kenya and parts of S Somalia were suffering the effects of a prolonged drought at the time of the workshop. Contingency plans for dealing with drought had been drawn up more than a year previously and the plans did not indicate that, if implemented, they would be insufficient to deal with drought. The workshop therefore began with an analysis of why existing contingency plans had not succeeded in preventing a serious humanitarian situation from developing. Participants discussed many reasons, which can be grouped under the headings below. Although the main focus was on the plans for (old) Garissa District, participants from Somalia felt the same issues related to their contingency planning processes. (Note: all comments here are those from participants.)

Emergency funds were not received on time

1. Donors responded too slowly
2. Needs were beyond the capacity of the Kenya Government
3. National fund management is slow and bureaucratic, where funds are held by the Treasury
4. There is an over-reliance on donors by District and by central Government
5. Lack of local resource mobilization
6. Corruption/theft of resources.

Weaknesses in the planning

7. Plans were “wish lists” not real plans, because they were not realistic
8. There were difficulties in knowing how to anticipate future resource, and hence on what scale to plan responses
9. There are questions as to whether the plans were based on the right strategy

Issues of preparedness

10. There was very little work on preparedness, due in part to a widespread and fundamental lack of a working ‘culture of preparedness’.
11. The contingency plans were never opened¹
12. After writing plans, nothing was done until there was a “wake-up call”
13. People were waiting for the wrong wake-up call! They waited to see livestock deaths before acting, rather than trying to prevent these.

Issues of implementation

14. The plans were not implemented on time (related only in part to the preparedness issues, above)
15. Plans had been implemented only in small parts: this was related partly – but only partly – to financing issues (see above).
16. Staff and organisations did not show commitment, and worked with inefficiency.
17. Actors in the District did not feel any ownership over the plans. These were seen as ‘Aridlands’ documents’. (see below)

Issues of ownership and lesson learning

18. There was weak participation of local actors in planning
19. There was no community participation in planning
20. There is no local or community participation in monitoring
21. Contingency planning has not been treated as a learning process. It’s a document; nothing is learned from writing or trying to implement them.
22. Contingency plans and their application have not been monitored or evaluated.

Coordination

23. Lack of understanding, between central Government, District donors and NGOs
24. Link between District and Nairobi was unclear. How were contingency plans used for planning at central level? Who was responsible for making the links?

Structural issues

25. ‘Development’ funding and planning is not related to emergency needs – and so it is not possible to “get out of the hole”.
26. There was a lack of flexibility between development and emergency funds and responses
27. Use of short term solutions – there is no sustainability
28. Changing context – it’s always ‘an emergency’

¹ Three participants had opened the documents since January 2009. Only one person had opened it as recently as June.

This analysis represented the background and gave us the challenge: we had to devise a contingency plan that would not have the above weaknesses but that would actually be useful.

Part 2 analysing the scenario

Meteorological predictions are that El Niño is likely, though it would not be too severe. This is a more likely scenario than another poor or failed rain and so it was the scenario that was planned for. Because of the objective of testing a new approach to contingency planning and the desire to extract as many lessons as possible out of the process it was preferred to analyse just one scenario, rather than to look at both floods and drought. (In a normal planning workshop, this would have been possible in the time.)

The overall scenario was for heavier than normal rains to begin mid-October and to run until the end of January. Flooding was expected from mid-November until the end of December. Poor rains in the following season (Apr-May 2010) were felt most likely though it is too early to have meteorological forecasts.

Participants then used their experience of previous El Niños to give a detailed description what was likely to happen week by week or month by month during the rains, if they fell according to the scenario description. The purpose of this very explicit and detailed description is four-fold.

- By detailing of the sequence of the impacts of the shock (here, floods), it is possible to design programmes to address these impacts rather than to programme generically for 'floods' or 'droughts' in general.
- Since local actors have very good knowledge about where each impact is likely to be felt, they can think about the geographical targeting and scale of programming from the beginning, which does not usually happen with generic programming.
- It is almost impossible to be on time with an intervention unless you have some way of knowing in advance when 'on time' will be. The crisis calendar analysis forces everyone to focus on when problems are expected, when interventions will probably need to be completed and hence when decisions will probably need to be made in order to avoid late response
- Because the timing of programmes is based on a clear and objective description of a potential crisis unfolding, it is possible to monitor any real crisis, compare this with the scenario calendar and constantly adjust both the timing of any interventions and the interventions themselves.

The description of the scenario is shown in the top part of fig 1 (shaded lilac)

The key possible events to which response would be necessary are:

- a) *Outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever.* These pose a multiple threat – a human health danger, death of livestock, and, even to places and herds not affected directly, the economic problems caused by quarantine and the crash in livestock (and milk) prices that would follow.
- b) *Floods.* This will cause displacement, with low lying settlements most at risk. In previous El Niños, almost half the population of the area was displaced. Floods will also cause some animal

deaths, especially of small stock, and the harvests from irrigated areas along the rivers will be lost. Irrigation infrastructure, such as pumps, will be destroyed unless they are removed in time.

- c) *Some roads become impassable.* This makes humanitarian access difficult, to populations already in need of humanitarian assistance because of the long drought, and disrupts trade. Food prices rose by up to 500% in the last El Niño because of the lack of market access. It is difficult to predict which roads will become impassable, because this depends upon the distribution of rainfall, though roads closest to some rivers are more likely to suffer.
- d) *Flooding of water sources.* This brings the threat of water borne diseases, including cholera.
- e) *Damage to infrastructure.* Apart from the temporary cutting off of some roads by flood waters, roads may suffer structural damage. Water pans can also suffer, being either silted up or having the dams breached. This may pose a problem in the following dry season when water will be scarce.
- f) *Cold.* Any rains need to be seen in the context of following on from a prolonged drought, which has left animals in weak condition. Many will not be able to withstand the cold and wet conditions, with weak animals dying in the first nights from cold stress, and others dying later of pneumonia or other diseases. Flooding will cause foot rot making it harder for animals to move – and bearing in mind their prior weak condition, this can be fatal.
- g) *Mosquitoes.* Increased breeding of mosquitoes could bring high levels of malaria to the human population.
- h) *On going distress.* Households are already facing serious problems with food security, and these may get worse. Although pasture will regenerate quickly with rains, household food security is slower to recover, since there are few animals to sell and milk production will be low for many months, until the next calving/kidding. If food prices rise in floods, this will be an increased stress on top of existing economic stress.

The most likely times when these impacts will be felt are all detailed in the crisis calendar.

Part 3: Analysing the response

Participants analysed which interventions would be most appropriate to face each of the identified possible problems, and also the most appropriate timing of each intervention.

The full intervention calendar is shown in the lower half of the crisis calendar, fig. 1.

Briefly, the main interventions needed for each of the identified threats are as follows.

- a) *Outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever.* Ideally a vaccination campaign would be completed one month before the danger begins in areas of highest risk. (The animals resistance takes one month to fully develop following inoculation.) At the very least, preparations need to be made so that it is possible to mount a very fast, reactive campaign of ‘ring vaccination’ of all animals within an area around any outbreak. This means that preparations need to be made to establish a system of disease identification and notification. Existing CAHWs need to be re-trained in recognition of RVF. [Note: the participants did not include anyone from the (human) health sector, and so any interventions needed in this sector were not included.] Everyone needs to be informed about the dangers of RVF – how to recognise it, how to report it and what precautions to take (e.g. not

eating meat from sick animals). This all needs to be in place before any likely outbreak. No specific measures were identified for mitigating the impacts of any quarantine and price shocks, though these need to be monitored and humanitarian aid to household food security may need to be increased.

b) *Floods.* Provision of shelter, including of emergency sanitation facilities may need to be provided. Nothing can be done to prevent the loss of irrigated fields, but support to re-establish production immediately the floods receded will enable farmers to profit from the high water availability. Populations in areas at risk need to be prepared, so that they can evacuate on time, without loss of life and with little loss of assets. Irrigation pumps need to be moved on time, so good river flood warning will need to be established, with a system for getting information about upstream water levels and relaying this to the populations in question.

c) *Some roads become impassable.* Little can be done to prevent this, in the time scale and resource levels available. Food stocks should be widely distributed before roads become impassable, whether at household level, encouraging higher stock levels with traders in the private sector², pre-positioning of food aid, etc. Possible flooding needs to be considered in timetabling all other interventions. Food prices should be monitored with plans made for decision making about levels of humanitarian assistance. (Households receiving food aid may not need any change in assistance.) Although participants felt that cash based interventions should play a greater role within humanitarian assistance in general (e.g. cash for work or food-aid-through-vouchers, the danger of high food prices over a critical two months makes this an inappropriate plan during this specific period (Nov-Dec).

d) *Flooding of water sources.* As mentioned the health sector did not participate in the planning. Hygiene education about how to avoid cholera and other WBDs should be completed before the danger period, and appropriate stocks of medicines and staff in place – taking into consideration a possible lack of physical access from mid-November until the end of December. Emergency water treatment should also take place for these few weeks. In some areas, safe borehole water would continue to be available, but many may choose to use unsafe water because of the cost of borehole water. In such areas, subsidies (e.g. free fuel) to boreholes would decrease the reliance on unsafe water sources.

e) *Damage to infrastructure.* Rehabilitation of infrastructure should begin as soon as possible after the floods. If this takes place through labour intensive techniques, this will provide income to many households during a time of stress, and so as much as possible of the work should be done during the most stressful time (Jan-Feb). This could be a useful replacement or partial replacement of food aid in this time, though a full feasibility analysis has not been made.

f) *Cold* No solutions have been found to aiding livestock survival during the initial cold stress. (In theory, providing fodder before the stress would build up the animals strength, but it is too late to consider this and no cost-benefit analysis was carried out.) For other livestock diseases, vet services need to be in readiness, i.e. any training needed of CAHWs carried out before the

² No specific interventions were discussed in this direction, though it may be a fruitful line for further analysis. Could traders hold larger stocks? What would prevent them and what could be done to counter these difficulties?

danger period (November), drugs made available, and systems established for the vet service delivery (e.g. if it is decided necessary to use any subsidies, vouchers, etc.)

g) *Mosquitoes* Anti-malarial drugs need to be in place before roads become impassable. No further analysis was made of anti-malarial measures (e.g. ITN, spraying, etc.)

h) *On going distress* It was beyond the scope of the workshop to analyse the humanitarian needs of different population groups for household food security support. In general, participants felt that where such support was needed, it should be made available as food aid (whether free food or FFW) during the months of low food availability, and through markets (e.g. cash-based interventions or food vouchers) when supply was higher (especially after harvests from February/March).

One or two proposed interventions are not mentioned here. One participant suggested re-seeding rangeland where nutritious plants had become depleted following the drought. Another had wanted an immediate food distribution to help animals survive until the pasture had regenerated. They are excluded because neither could be carried out in time, even if funds were made available immediately. It should be noted that all interventions proposed and listed are those of the participants. The facilitator did not propose or reject any and did not give technical recommendations. No cost-benefit analysis or feasibility analysis was carried out of any of the interventions. There was also no time to make a detailed study of the likely scale of implementation of any actual intervention (though the criteria for making these decisions was discussed, see below, *analysis of the scale of response*). All of these are urgently needed in order to turn the above list of suggestions into a genuine action plan.

Part 4 Analysing the start up and decision dates

It is obvious that the outputs of any project are not completed on the day a decision is made to implement it – not even on the day when activities start. Failure to think about this advance, though, is common, and evaluations of emergency response to crises in the Horn show that decisions to implement projects have often been taken at the time they are needed. As a result the projects are implemented too late, because the time from the ‘start-up’ (the department/organisation starting to work on the project) and the ‘start’ of the projects (on the ground flow of benefits beginning) can be several months.

Participants analysed two proposed interventions to look at all the steps they would need to take from decision making (start-up) to the ‘actual start’ of the project from the perspective of those affected.

The projects chosen were RVF vaccination and???. The participants’ start-up time lines were very consistent with others drawn up by a wide variety of people (from local Government, NGOs, etc.) across the Horn in various workshops: around three to four months. Both groups also reflected the general estimation of finding resources from donors as taking around 4 weeks. This is often a serious under-estimate. (Funds can take up to twelve months to arrive! Where Government funding is needed from money not already held in a District budget, several months

are needed.) It should also be noted that, although delays are routinely blamed on donors' slowness, the start-up timeline was usually estimated at over two months even excluding the time for writing proposals, negotiating with donors (including line Ministries or the Treasury), etc. An actual start-up timeline depends in part on the source of any funding needed, in part on the state of preparedness of the implementing agency (Government or non-Government) and in part on other local factors.

Final decision making dates were then put on the crisis calendar. Since a full analysis of each intervention was not conducted, these are very rough. These can be seen on fig. 1. It is immediately clear that the decision dates for many proposed interventions have already passed and that unless very swift decision making and planning starts immediately, it will be impossible to implement any interventions on time. The conclusion is clear: contingency planning for El Niño floods needs to be carried out as a matter of extreme urgency in all Districts and at national level, or not at all.

Some other questions still remain from the calendar. In principle, RVF vaccination is needed before any outbreak to prevent the disease: some supplies for emergency shelter need purchasing before any floods for rapid response. Can anyone be persuaded to fund such activities when no crisis has yet happened? Changing approaches to funding and emergency response in this way is a major task.

Part 5 Analysis of preparedness

Preparedness can be defined (and measured) as being in a position to begin to complete outputs as quickly as possible after decision making, i.e. making the time from the 'start-up' to the 'start' as short as possible. Further analysis of the start-up was undertaken by participants. What could be done to shorten the timelines? Overall it was seen that almost all the necessary steps of the start-up could be carried out before any crisis hits and with a minimal use of resources. The investment in time that would be needed would be considered 'an insurance premium'. Although actual contracts with suppliers cannot be signed before funds are available or confirmed, pre-qualification and 'contingency tenders' (and agreement to supply in the event that goods or services were needed) could be carried out. Many on the ground activities could be carried out. e.g. training of CAHWs on RVF should be incorporated onto on-going longer term animal health care programmes. (See the criticism raised in part 1: development programmes have too often not been used to help prepare for emergencies.) Resource mobilisation can also begin before any crisis. Long term relationships can be developed with donors (including line Ministries and the Treasury) to discuss overall contingency response strategies, proposal formats can be discussed and prepared for, draft proposals can be developed and discussed pro-actively with donors, etc. Although the Government is currently finalising the operationalisation of its National Drought Contingency Fund, this will not be ready in time for any El Niño floods and the scale of resources available should not be expected to cover all needs. (Current contingency funds available to Districts are important but limited.) Participants concluded that the main obstacles to preparedness were the 'working culture' and sense of ownership/accountability, rather than any financial or 'technical' constraints (i.e. they know what to do and could find the resources to do it,

if having a coherent strategy and being prepared for it was something that their performance was evaluated by, and if they weren't constantly under pressure to implement *ad hoc* activities at short notice. See below.) Participants felt that the timelines could probably be reduced to around 2-3 weeks excluding the time to source funds, though there was not time to fully analyse all the steps that would have to be taken for each project.

Participants all felt that they had not prepared a comprehensive and coordinated (i.e. inter-sector and inter-agency) response strategy before, and that any contingency plans written had never triggered preparedness, i.e. steps taken before the crisis to make any eventual implementation faster. One of the main obstacles was that since plans were written in the framework of the DSG, plans were therefore the responsibility of 'Aridlands'. Although the DSG is a forum to which all actors (Government, local Government and non-Government are invited and everyone can ask for a meeting or an agenda item to be discussed, there is still a feeling that DSGs belong to 'Aridlands' (i.e. ALRMP) and that as soon as this project ends, the DSGs will die. This lack of ownership was also found during a similar planning process undertaken by DMI in Wajir in April/May 09, and which is described in the trip report³. Participants nevertheless all agreed that having some forum where a coordinated strategy could be drawn up would be useful, even essential, and none could suggest a more appropriate forum than the DSG for doing this.

The session ended with a discussion on how much could be achieved by changing *attitudes*. Whereas the common tendency is to blame operational difficulties on others ('the donors are slow', 'resources are not there', 'the DSG has not coordinated preparedness activities'), it would be more useful for each individual and each agency to ask the question "what would I need to do to help ... make the donor faster, to help make more resources available, to bring about coordination of preparedness by the DSG, etc.?"

[*Note from facilitator*. This issue still needs to be addressed much further. What causes the current attitudes and what blocks a sense of ownership and personal responsibility for outcomes? This has not been fully resolved. The questions also need asking at central level: what does each individual, each Ministry, etc need to do to bring about such an attitude change?]

Part 6 Analysis of scale

It was impossible within the time frame to go through each intervention and look at the likely scale needed for any interventions. Instead there was some discussion about the criteria needed to decide on scale.

One major problem in planning a coherent overall response to a crisis is that resource levels are hard to predict. Often, plans are based on estimated overall need, but resources available may only be fraction of this. The contingency plan then becomes quite unrelated to the actual response, and does not help in practice in determining how funds should be prioritised – in other words, actual implementation cannot be guided by any overall strategy that was discussed during the contingency planning process before the crisis.

³ "Notes from a Visit to Wajir by Ali Hassan and Simon Levine, for DMI/AridLands", April 09

On the other hand if planning were done according to funds actually available, this would not guide a major response and could not be used as a basis for sourcing funds.

Planning can be done in various ways:

- on the basis of need – but this needs some way of predicting needs in an objective and transparent way
- on the basis of funds likely to be available
- on the basis of funds actually available.

However, all of these may be limited by what the capacity limits of the implementing organisations.

Since it is likely that planning will often not be able to meet all needs, it needs to be made fairly explicit how aid will be targeted, including;

- which sectors are given priority and why
- which activities within the sector are given priority and why
- which geographical areas are given priority and why
- which population groups/categories are given priority and why.

In many cases there may be no choice except to have two or three action plans, based on an optimistic (but not fanciful!) estimate of possible resources, a most likely case and a more pessimistic estimate. This will not always involve much extra work: in some cases, the pessimistic case will be a shortened list of the optimistic case, but not necessarily.

In some cases, with fewer funds a completely different strategy may be best.

In all cases where funds are likely to be less than what is required, it will be necessary to:

- Look for other funds
- Look to do things without cost
- Mobilise local resources
- Use the resources we have much better
- Plan together with other donors as much as possible in advance, in order to have the best chance of increasing funds
- Have a strategy for mobilising funds.

As a coordinated team in a District or group of Districts, look at who is the best placed to approach which donors; Work together to produce a good advocacy plan; Have good proposals that are clearly based on agreed and shared strategies. Communicate early and often with donors.

Part 7 Analysis of cross-border coordination

Participants next looked at whether or not the effort and costs of making a joint cross-border plan really added any value. On all sides it was felt important to design joint development and response strategies for a number of reasons, even though implementation would necessarily be on a national level.

The whole area from Mandera to Garissa and down to Lower Juba is actually a single economic area: Lower Juba is the dry season grazing land for much of the Kenya eastern pastoral areas, and Kenya is an important market for Somali livestock (especially cattle). Migrations can happen twice a year from one country to the other. An overall intervention strategy therefore needs to consider factors such as:

- i) The need to treat animal health over the whole area (cross-border) as otherwise if measures are only taken in one country (or even District) diseases can return quickly from the other country.
- ii) Practically, any livestock intervention needs to consider where livestock are at any one time. Livestock numbers in a District are usually given as single number – these are in fact not the livestock in a District but the livestock population owned by people residing in the District. For example, at the time of the workshop, there were almost no cattle in Garissa, Lagdera or Fafi Districts, though this is not indicated in contingency plans.
- iii) Migration is a response strategy of pastoralists and needs to be considered in our planning. In some cases it should be supported directly. Decisions need to be taken as to whether to encourage livestock to move to certain areas, e.g. by providing water in areas of pasture, or whether to encourage them to stay out of those areas (e.g. by not providing water there!) in order to keep them as reserve areas. This cannot be done on a district or even national basis.
- iv) Humanitarian interventions can influence migration in many ways, e.g. people may cross borders in order to receive some aid. Coordinating the aid on both sides of the border may be useful in many cases.
- v) Some conflict is over resources and can be predicted and mitigated if addressed on both sides of the border before the migration happens. (There are already initiatives taking place addressing these kinds of issues with some success.)
- vi) Information sharing is essential in many ways, as people, livestock, diseases all move and need to be tracked before they cross borders.
- vii) cross-border trade is essential to the household economy of pastoralists and can be of mutual benefit to both sides, e.g. to Somali pastoralists selling animals and to Kenyan traders and consumers buying the cattle. This sometimes needs to be supported (e.g. transactions costs can be high where trade is formally closed) and always needs to be factored into analysis.
- viii) Both people and ideas move across the border. Messages can best be conveyed where they are coordinated.
- ix) Because of security, access to the population in Somalia may sometimes best be found by giving messages or service (e.g. vaccines) on the Kenyan side, especially where it is in Kenyan's interests that the services be provided (e.g. disease control).

Action points

Three main areas were identified for immediate action.

Conflict- Cross border contacts between pastoral communities is needed to manage conflicts. This needs to be organised by various organisations, especially NGOs. These need to be coordinated. PACT will take the lead, since it is already playing this role, in coordinating the strategy of the NGOs in organising contacts. It was noted that this role is currently related to a short term project but the role actually needs to be formalised – and financed – in a more permanent way.

Marketing-Two separate trading areas exist: the northern part of the border (Mandera) and the southern part (Wajir-Garissa). (References are to 'old' Districts). VSF-Su will take the lead in the North and CARE in the south in promoting dialogue on smooth cross border trade.

Coordination of interventions: It was felt that strategic planning meetings are needed twice a year, and that participants from Somalia should joint those in Kenya. Equally, strategic coordination meetings would be useful in Kenya between various Districts. Resources for this need to be sought.

Part 8 Re-visiting the limitations of previous contingency planning

The final session revisited the list of critiques offered by participants of previous attempts at contingency planning to see whether or not a way forward had been found that would avoid or at least reduce the problems faced by previous contingency planning exercises.

It was felt that many –in fact, more than half – of the criticisms could be addressed by nothing more than a change in attitude (e.g. issues around ownership of contingency planning, community participation, evaluating and learning from plans, etc.). Many of the others could be addressed in part by a change in ways of working, e.g. donor funds could come earlier if they were solicited earlier, if previous contacts were made with donors, if District level actors were more proactive in asking donors what was needed in order to facilitate the flow of funds, if District actors produced a clearer strategy with higher quality proposals, etc. Although none of these measures would guarantee faster or more funds, they could influence the outcome to some degree.

The challenge now is to effect a change in these ways of working!

Annex 1 Crisis calendar

excel file attached

Annex 2 List of participants

	Name	Organization	Address
1.	Saadi Noor	Arid Lands Project	Garissa
2.	Abdiaziz Duwane	AFREC	Lower Juba –Somalia
3.	Mohamed Ahmed	AFREC	Lower Juba –Somalia
4.	Dr. Rashid Mohamed	DVO –Garissa	Garissa
5.	Ahmed A. Adan	District Water Officer	Garissa
6.	Bashir A. Muhumed	District Agricultural Officer	Garissa
7.	Ahmed Hassan	CARE Kenya	Garissa
8.	Josephat K. Kerero	DAO	Modogashe
9.	Ahmed Mohamed	Program Coordinator PEACE II – PACT Kenya	Mandera
10.	Tobias Ounga	VSF-Suisse	Lower Juba
11.	Dr. Muriira Joseph	DVO –Lagdera	Modogashe
12.	Titus M. Utungo	DAO – Fafi	Fafi district
13.	Aydrus S. Daar	WASDA	Wajir/Lower Juba
14.	Mohamed Abdullahi	OXFAM GB –Southern Somalia	Nairobi
15.	Robert Okumu	District Officer 1- Fafi district	Bura
16.	Ali D. Odowa	DLPO –Garissa	Garissa
17.	Mohamoud A. Haji	CARE Kenya	Garissa
18.	Hassan O. Shurie	CDF – Dujis Constituency	Garissa
19.	Okal Joel S.	DLPO –Lagdera	Modogashe
20.	Felister Wanjiru Mwaura	ALRMP	Garissa
21.	Abdikadir Farah	Chairman –CDF Lagdera	
22.	Ibrahim M. Nur	CARE Somalia/RCU	Nairobi
23.	Simon Levin	Consultant/CARE Somalia	Kampala

Annex 3

Abbreviations used

CAHW	Community Animal Health Worker
RVF	Rift Valley Fever
DSG	District Steering Group
ITN	Insecticide Treated Nets
WBD	Water Borne Diseases
DMO	Drought Management Officer